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Introduction
MEDIATOR STYLES-sometimes referred to as mediation mod-
els-are terms used to describe a neutral's approach or conduct dur-
ing mediation. Many scholars have categorized mediator styles using a
variety of terms and concepts. Few have examined mediator styles in
conjunction with impartiality provisions of newly developing ethical
standards of conduct. Tension has developed because mediators are
guided by written definitions and ethical standards, yet their actual
roles may be dictated by their own personal style, values, and commer-
cial needs in conjunction with the participants' particular needs.
This Article examines current laws, policies, and procedures that
define and attempt to regulate the mediation field. Specifically, this
Article concentrates on three inter-related aspects of mediation: (1)
definitions of the term "mediation" to highlight the prominent role of
mediator impartiality in the mediation process; (2) impartiality re-
quirements found in ethical standards of conduct; and (3) mediator
styles and mediation models. The objective is to illustrate the tension
created by requirements of mediator neutrality and impartiality when
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applied to various mediator styles and mediation models and to pro-
pose possible solutions to alleviate the tension.
As a side note, this Author acknowledges that scholars and practi-
tioners have been debating the appropriateness of evaluative and
facilitative mediator styles for more than a decade. This Article does
not seek to participate in such a debate. Rather, this Author describes
various styles employed by mediators and summarizes some of the crit-
icisms to the extent they relate to mediator neutrality and impartiality.
The Article is divided into several main sections. Part I examines
definitions of "mediation." Although no universally accepted defini-
tion exists, most definitions include key terms and provisions such as a
neutral third party, mediator impartiality, and party self-determina-
tion. Part II summarizes some of the impartiality provisions found in
various ethical standards of conduct designed to regulate the media-
tion field with respect to civil disputes.' Part III examines mediator
styles and mediation models (hereinafter referred to collectively as
mediator styles, unless otherwise specified). Part IV provides an in-
depth analysis of the mediator's dilemma: How can a mediator be
neutral and impartial when engaged in any and all mediation styles?
This Author concludes that mediator styles can and do affect the
mediator's ability to remain neutral and impartial. Part V, therefore,
poses recommendations to help alleviate the tension between media-
tor styles and impartiality requirements. In turn, these recommenda-
tions can be used to initiate a dialogue about the regulation of the
mediation field, including the appropriateness of mediation defini-
tions. The conclusion is set forth in Part VI.
I. Defining the Nature of Mediation
From the earliest development of mediation, scholars, practicing
mediators, regulators, and legislators have attempted to define the
term "mediation." Most agree that mediation involves a neutral and
impartial third party who assists others in resolving a dispute. Simply
put, mediation is facilitated negotiation because the mediator has no
decision-making authority. 2 The various definitions include other key
terms and many acknowledge varying styles, techniques, and orienta-
tions of mediation. The conventional definitions of mediation are sig-
nificant as ethical standards develop, evolve, and indeed begin to
1. This Article is limited to a discussion of general civil mediation standards of con-
duct and does not address specific subject areas such as the regulation of family law and
divorce mediation, which are often regulated by separate rules and procedures.
2. See infta Part I.A.
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impinge on mediator styles. As Professor Joseph Stulberg wrote over
two decades ago: "[P]aradoxically, while the use of mediation has ex-
panded, a common understanding as to what constitutes mediation
has weakened .... It is important... to identify and clarify the princi-
ples and dynamics which together constitute mediation as a dispute
settlement procedure. ' The natural starting point is to examine and
recognize definitions of mediation before addressing other aspects of
this Article.
A. Various Definitions of "Mediation"
The term "mediation" does not have one established definition,
although it includes many universally-accepted components. Among
representative examples, mediation has been defined as:
"[F] acilitated negotiation."4
"[A]n informal process in which a neutral third party with no
power to impose a resolution helps the disputing parties to try to
reach a mutually acceptable settlement."5
"Third party dispute settlement technique integrally related to
the negotiation process whereby a skilled, disinterested neutral assists
parties in changing their minds over conflicting needs mainly through
the noncompulsory applicants of various forms of persuasion in order
to reach a viable agreement on terms at issue."'6
"[T]he intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an accept-
able, impartial, and neutral third party who has no authoritative deci-
sion-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching
their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute."7
"[A] process involving a neutral third party in a purely facilitative,
process-director's role, who makes no substantive contribution to the
parties' struggle with the dispute.""
"A process in which the disputing parties select a neutral third
party to assist them in reaching a settlement of the dispute. The pro-
3. Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind,
6 VT. L. REV. 85, 85 (1981).
4. STEPHENJ. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 201 (2001).
5. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RE-
SPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 2 (1994).
6. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 275 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999).
7. Id. at 277.
8. DwIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS
AND MEDIATORS § 10 (1996) [hereinafter GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES] (MaIjorie
Corman Aaron, contributing author) (offering a definition of mediation that essentially
precludes mediator evaluation).
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cess is private, voluntary, informal and nonbinding. The mediator has
no power to impose a settlement." 9
"[A] n impartial third party helps others negotiate to resolve a dis-
pute or plan a transaction. Unlike a judge or arbitrator, the mediator
lacks authority to impose a solution."' 0
"A voluntary process in which an impartial mediator actively as-
sists disputants in identifying and clarifying issues of concern and in
designing and agreeing to solutions for those issues.""
The foregoing definitions highlight the consensual and informal
process inherent in mediations. Requirements of fairness and just re-
sult are noticeably absent from the definitions. Most definitions, how-
ever, include key provisions, such as the mediator's ability to be
neutral and impartial and the parties' ability to negotiate a resolution
of their own choosing-party self-determination. The following sec-
tion examines the meaning of "neutrality," "impartiality," and "party
self-determination" as applied to mediations. Understanding these key
terms is a prerequisite to the study of various mediator styles.
B. Key Provisions
1. The Significance of Mediator Neutrality
Neutrality means the refusal to ally with, support, or favor any
side in a dispute; "belonging to neither side nor party."12 A mediator's
neutrality is her ability to be objective while facilitating communica-
tion among negotiating parties.' 3 Neutrality can be both transparent
and opaque: "[T] ransparent because it operates on the basis of widely
held assumptions about power and conflict, and opaque because it is
exceedingly difficult to raise questions about the nature and practice
of neutrality from within this consensus."' 4
9. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 277. In a similar definition,
Dwight Golann adds that the following definition does not preclude a mediator from pro-
viding some evaluation: "a process in which disputing parties are assisted by a neutral third
party to negotiate a resolution of their dispute, where the neutral third party is not given
the power to impose a resolution upon them." GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, supra
note 8, § 10.
10. LEONARD L. RISKIN &JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERs 313
(2d ed. 2003).
11. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 278.
12. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 460 (1983).
13. SeeJAMESJ. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (2001).
14. Id. at 169 (quoting Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing
Neutrality in Mediation, 1991 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 37).
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2. The Significance of Mediator Impartiality
"Impartiality means freedom from favoritism and bias in word,
action and appearance."'15 The key to this requirement is the media-
tor's ability to serve all participants concurrently. 16 A mediator must
not exhibit any partiality or bias based on any party's background, per-
sonal characteristics, or performance during the mediation.1 7 The
role of impartiality should apply to all aspects of the mediation, in-
cluding communication (both spoken and unspoken), the way ques-
tions are asked and positions and interests are reframed, the use and
arrangement of furniture, seating arrangements, and methods to
greet the participants as they arrive for the mediation.' 8 Impartiality
also has been applied to relational issues such as conflict of interest
concerns between the mediator and any of the participants.
Based on the principle of "impartiality," many scholars debate
whether mediators should report to an appropriate authority regard-
ing a participant's "bad faith" behavior and whether such reports in-
fringe on a mediator's impartiality. 19 Mediator reporting also may
affect procedural fairness in a mediation and lower the parties' sense
of expectation and empowerment. 20 A mediator must realize that not
only is her actual impartiality at stake, but also the appearance of
impartiality.
When mediation professionals compare the concepts of neutral-
ity and impartiality, some equate neutrality to the mediation process,
including its outcome. Others equate impartiality to the relationship
between the mediator and participants. Still others refer to the two
terms interchangeably. 21 For purposes of this Article, the terms are
used interchangeably unless otherwise designated.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 68 (Phyllis Bernard & Bry-
ant Garth eds., 2002) [hereinafter DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS] (citing GUIDELINES FOR




18. See Karen A. Zerhusen, Reflections on the Role of the Neutral Lawyer: The Lawyer as
Mediator, 81 Ky. L.J. 1165, 1169-70 (1993) (noting that a mediator's impartiality applies to
all aspects of the mediation process, from the arrangement of furniture to the way the
mediator poses positioning statements).
19. See Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports Under the
Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003J. Disp.
RESOL. 67 (discussing the pros and cons of a mediator's authority to report "bad faith"
behavior to outside sources such as courts and administrative agencies).
20. Id. at 74.
21. See id. at 83-87 (using the terms "neutrality" and "impartiality" interchangeably as
the authors discuss the standard of conduct for mediator impartiality).
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3. The Requirement of Party Self-Determination
Party self-determination is considered the "fundamental principle
of mediation." 22 Party autonomy is evidenced not only by references
to the word "self-determination" but also by a mediator's responsibility
to help parties reach a voluntary and informed decision. 23 To achieve
party autonomy, a mediator may provide information to the parties
regarding the mediation process, raise issues, and help parties explore
various options. 24 The mediator must be cautious not to jeopardize
her neutrality and impartiality. Likewise, she must be careful to the
extent she is directive because many ethical standards of conduct spe-
cifically preclude a mediator from coercing parties to settle or other-
wise exert undue influence. 25
A mediator can jeopardize party self-determination by raising is-
sues or suggesting options, especially when done after the parties have
agreed to a settlement, albeit one that appears unfair or one-sided.
These concerns also affect the mediator's duty of neutrality and im-
partiality because a simple question or suggestion may appear to ad-
vance only one party's interests. Party self-determination is thus
directly related to, and affected by, the mediator's duties of neutrality
and impartiality. Even though this Article focuses on the concepts of
mediator neutrality and impartiality, discussions of party self-determi-
nation are included to the extent the concepts intricately interface
with one another.
H. Impartiality Requirements in Ethical Standards of
Conduct
During the last two decades, many governmental entities and pro-
fessional organizations have begun to develop ethical standards of
conduct for mediators ("Standards"). This Author has conducted ex-
tensive research regarding Standards, 2 6 having examined the Model
22. DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS, supra note 15, at 73.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 73-74.
26. See Susan Nauss Exon, How Can a Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical
Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 387 [hereinafter Exon,
Why Ethical Standards Create Chaos]; Susan Nauss Exon, The Fallacy of a "One Size Fits All"
Mediator in Terms of Neutrality and Impartiality: A Study that Compares Mediator Styles
with Ethical Standards of Conduct (Apr. 10, 2006) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Pepperdine
University School of Law) (on file with author).
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Standards of Conduct for Mediators including its 2005 revision
27
("Model Standards"), the Uniform Mediation Act 28 ("UMA"), and
state-wide Standards found in thirty-six states, including twenty-seven
court-connected Standards and thirteen Standards promulgated by
professional organizations. 29
Although Standards are varied in form and content, all those ex-
amined require mediator impartiality. 30 Nevertheless, the impartiality
provisions are far from uniform in scope. Some Standards have exten-
sive definitions of impartiality, some have virtually nothing other than
a statement that a mediator shall maintain impartiality, and others fall
somewhere in between. Some impartiality provisions address conflict
of interest concerns between the mediator and participants rather
than addressing mediator behavior. All of these aspects of impartiality
are discussed in this Part.
A. The Model Standards of Conduct
The Model Standards define impartiality as "freedom from favor-
itism, bias or prejudice," avoiding even the appearance of partiality. 31
Additional comments instruct a mediator to maintain impartiality in
respect to the participants' "personal characteristics, background, val-
ues and beliefs, or performance at a mediation, or any other rea-
son."32 The Model Standards provide fairly straightforward guidance,
yet leave room for interpretation, thereby acknowledging the flexible
nature of the mediation process.
B. The Uniform Mediation Act
Technically the UMA is not an ethical code of conduct. It focuses
primarily on confidentiality and privilege issues, leaving ethical Stan-
dards to the expertise of professional organizations such as the Ameri-
can Bar Association ("ABA"), the American Arbitration Association
27. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at http://
www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model-standardsconduct_april2007.pdf.
28. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003), avadable at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf.
29. See Exon, Why Ethical Standards Create Chaos, supra note 26, at app. A. Some states
have both court-connected standards and standards promulgated by a professional organi-
zation. As a result, this Author examined forty sets of Standards for the thirty-six states.
30. See id. at 395-96.
31. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS II.A, B.
32. Id. at II.B.1.
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("AAA"), and the Association for Conflict Resolution ("ACR") .33 One
exception exists regarding mediator impartiality,3 4 and that portion of
the UMA is summarized in this Part.
The ACR intended that both the mediator and the process be
neutral;3 5 therefore, it urged the drafters of the UMA to include medi-
ator impartiality as part of the definition of "mediator. '3 6 The drafters
of the UMA refused.3 7
Instead, section 9 of the UMA addresses the principle of imparti-
ality as it relates to conflict of interest concerns.3 8 A mediator must
disclose facts that might affect a mediator's impartiality, including fi-
nancial, personal interest in the outcome, and existing or past rela-
tionships.3 9 If any conflict of interest exists, the participants may waive
it by agreeing to allow the mediator to proceed. 40 Otherwise, section 9
simply states that a "mediator must be impartial." 4 1
Although not specifically referring to "impartiality," section 7 of
the UMA aligns with the notion of mediator impartiality because it
prohibits mediators from reporting to outside authorities such as
courts and administrative agencies. 42 This non-reporting principle is
consistent with the separate confidentiality principle, 43 and fosters
public confidence in a neutral mediator and neutral process.
4 4
C. Various State Standards
1. Standards that Define Impartiality
Some Standards provide helpful definitions of impartiality. Many
Standards include definitions of impartiality similar to the Model
Standards. For example, the Minnesota Code of Ethics for Neutrals
and the Montana Mediation Association Standards of Practice Ethical
33. David A. Hoffman, Symposium: Introduction, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 61, 64-65 (ac-
knowledging the ethical standards already developed by the ABA, AAA, and ACR).
34. Id. at 65.
35. Monica Rausch, The Uniform Mediation Act, 18 OHIo ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 603, 614
(2003).
36. The UMA defines "mediator" as "an individual who conducts a mediation." UNIF.
MEDIATION AcT § 2(3) (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf.
37. Rausch, supra note 35, at 614.
38. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 9.
39. Id. § 9(a).
40. Id. § 9(g).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 7.
43. Id. § 8.
44. Id. § 7 cmt. 1.
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Guidelines for Full Members both define impartiality as "freedom
from favoritism or bias either by word or action, and a commitment to
serve all parties as opposed to a single party. '45 Massachusetts simply
defines "impartiality" as "freedom from favoritism and bias in conduct
as well as appearance. '46 Twelve other states incorporate similar defi-
nitions into their Standards.47
45. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114 app. I cmt. 1, available at http://www.mncourts.gov/
ruledocs/general/GRtitleII.htm; STANDARDS OF PRACTICE: ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR FULL
MEMBERS 4 (Mont. Mediation Ass'n 1998), available at http://mtmediation.org/doc/
Full%20Ethics%20&%20Quals.pdf.
46. MAss. Sup. CT. R. 1:18, UNIF. RULES ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9(b), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/admin/legal/newadrbook.pdf.
47. ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS 5(a) (Ala. Ctr. for Dispute Resolution
1997), available at http://www.alabamaadr.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=
view&id=24&Itemid=6 (defining impartiality as "freedom from favoritism or bias in work,
action, and appearance, impartiality implies a commitment to aid all parties, as opposed to
one or more specific parties, in moving toward agreement"); REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CON-
DUCT OF MEDIATION & MEDIATORS III.5.A (Ark. Alternative Dispute Resolution Comm'n
2001), available at http://courts.state.ar.us/pdf/0516_conduct.pdf ("Impartiality means
freedom from favoritism or bias in work, action, and appearance. Impartiality implies a
commitment to aid all parties, as opposed to one or more specific parties, in moving to-
ward agreement."); FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED & CT.-APPoINTED MEDIATORS 10.330(a), available
at http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/adr/bin/RulesForMediators.pdf (defining media-
tor impartiality as "freedom from favoritism or bias in word, action, or appearance" and
instructing the mediator to assist all parties rather than any one person); GUIDELINES FOR
HAwAi MEDIATORS III.1 (Haw. Comm. on Mediation Standards 2002), available at http://
www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/3D52C4AB783B29B7EC64289CC8/guidelines.pdf
("Impartiality means freedom from favoritism and bias in word, action, and appearance.
Impartiality implies a commitment to aid all participants, as opposed to a single individual
in reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement."); MARYLAND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS II.A, B (Md. Program for Mediator Excellence 2006), available at http://www.
courts.state.md.us/macro/approvedstandardsofconduct42006.pdf (defining impartiality as
"freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice"); MANUAL OF STANDARDS & ETHICS FOR COURT
MEDIATORS, DiRs. & STAFF III.A.1 (Neb. Office of Dispute Resolution 2001), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/mediation/pdf/Standards-Ethics-Manual-June-2001-ver-
sion.pdf ("A mediator should strive to maintain impartiality towards all parties and be free
of favoritism or bias in appearance, word, and action. A mediator is committed to aiding all
parties, as opposed to a single party, in exploring the possibilities for resolution."); CODE
OF ETHICAL CONDUCT 4.B (N.M. Mediation Ass'n 1995), available at http://cio.state.nm.us/
content/guidelinesStds/archive/adr/NMMACodeofEthics.pdf ("Impartiality, in word or
action means: i) freedom from bias or favoritism. ii) A commitment to aid all parties
equally in reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement. iii) That a mediator will not play an
adversarial role in the process of dispute resolution."); NORTH CAROLINA STANDARDS OF
PROF'L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS II.A (N.C. Dispute Resolution Comm'n 2006), available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Documents/standardsofconduct.
pdf (defining impartiality as the "absence of prejudice or bias in word and action....
[and] a commitment to aid all parties, as opposed to a single party, in exploring the pos-
sibilities for resolution"); TENN. SUP. CT. R. app. A § 6(a), available at http://
www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/TNRulesOfCourt/06supct25-end.htm#31
("Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias in word, action, and appearance.
Impartiality implies a commitment to aid all parties, as opposed to an individual party
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Some Standards caution mediators to avoid partiality, including
the appearance of partiality, 48 or require a mediator to "avoid any
conduct that gives the appearance of either favoring or disfavoring
any party."49 Like the Model Standards, some state Standards warn
mediators about prejudice or partiality based on "any party's personal
characteristics, background, or behavior during the mediation."
50
In conjunction with impartiality provisions, a mediator may raise
questions to enable the parties to consider the "fairness, equity, and
feasibility" of proposed settlement options and may withdraw from the
mediation if she believes she can no longer maintain impartiality. 51 A
conducting Rule 31 ADR processes."); TEXAS ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS 9 cmt.
(Tex. Advisory Comm. on Court-Annexed Mediations 2005), available at http://
www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/05/05910700.pdf ("Impartiality means free-
dom from favoritism or bias in word, action, and appearance; it implies a commitment to
aid all parties in reaching a settlement."); UTAH R. OF CT.-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 104, Canon IlI(a)(1), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/
adr/104.htm (defining impartial as "free from favoritism or bias in word, action or appear-
ance, and includes a commitment to assist all participants as opposed to any one individ-
ual"); VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS
G. IUudicial Council of Va. 2002), available at http://www.nvms.us/PDFs/Ethics.pdf ("Im-
partiality means freedom from favoritism or bias in word, action, and appearance. Imparti-
ality implies a commitment to aid all parties in moving toward an agreement.").
48. See, e.g., GA. SuP. CT. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. app. C, ch. 1.A.III.A,
available at http://godr.org/pdfs/APPENDIX%20C,%20Chap%201,%2011-21-07.pdf ("A
mediator must demonstrate impartiality in word and deed. A mediator must scrupulously
avoid any appearance of partiality."); IND. R. OF CT., RULES FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION 7.4(C), (D), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/adr/adr.pdf ("A neu-
tral shall be impartial and.., shall avoid the appearance of impropriety.... ."); MARYLAND
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS II.B (Md. Program for Mediator Excellence 2006),
available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/macro/approvedstandardsofconduct42006.pdf
("A mediator shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that
gives the appearance of partiality.").
49. NEW JERSEY STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS IN COURT-CONNECTED PRO-
GRAMS II.A (N.J. Ass'n of Prof'l Mediators 2000), available at http://
nj courts.j udiciary.state. nj .us/web0/notices/reports/MediatorStandards.pdf.
50. Id. at II.B; see MARYLAND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS II.B.1 ("A media-
tor should not act with partiality or prejudice based on any participant's personal charac-
teristics, background, values and beliefs, or performance at a mediation, or any other
reason."); UTAH R. OF CT.-ANNEXED ALTERNATiVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 104, Canon
111(a) (2), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/adr/104.htm ("ADR prov-
iders should guard against bias or partiality based on the participants' personal characteris-
tics, background or performance at the proceeding.").
51. ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS 5(a) (Ala. Ctr. for Dispute Resolution
1997), available at http://www.alabamaadr.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view
&id=24&Itemid=6; see, e.g., REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF MEDIATION & MEDIATORS
III.5.A (Ark. Alternative Dispute Resolution Comm'n 2001), available at http://courts.state.
ar.us/pdf/0516_conduct.pdf; GUIDELINES FOR HAWAII MEDIATORS III.1 (Haw. Comm. on
Mediation Standards 2002), available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/3D52C4
AB783B29B7EC64289CC8/guidelines.pdf; TENN. SUP. CT. R. app. A, § 6(a)(1), available at
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mediator may withdraw either based on her personal opinion regard-
ing impartiality or based on a party's request. 52
2. Standards that Refer to Impartiality Without Defining It
Other Standards provide less guidance because they prohibit im-
partial behavior without defining what it means. For example, several
states refer to impartiality by simply requiring a mediator to be "im-
partial and evenhanded." 53 Michigan's impartiality provision states:
A mediator shall conduct the mediation in an impartial manner.
The concept of mediator impartiality is central to the mediation
process. A mediator shall mediate only those matters in which it is
possible to remain impartial and even-handed. If at any time the
mediator is unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner,
the mediator is obligated to withdraw. 54
Like the Michigan impartiality provision, some states have vague
descriptions of impartiality because they may require a mediator to
maintain impartiality or conduct the mediation in an impartial man-
ner. 55 One example requires mediators to "approach the mediation
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/TNRulesOfCourt/O6supct25_end.
htm#31.
52. See, e.g., TEXAS ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS 9 cmt. (Tex. Advisory Comm'n
on Court-Annexed Mediations 2005), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/
MiscDocket/05/05910700.pdf; UTAH R. OF CT.-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION 104, Canons II(e), (f), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/adr/
104.htm.
53. Miss. CT. ANNEXED MEDIATION R. FOR CIVIL LITIG. XV.B, available at http://
www.mssc.state.ms.us/rules/msrulesofcourt/court_annexed-mediaion.pdf. Utah also re-
quires a mediator to conduct proceedings in an "evenhanded manner," but is much more
specific than Mississippi. UTAH R. OF CT.-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 104,
Canon 111(a). Utah goes on to require a mediator to "treat all parties with equality and
fairness at all stages of the proceedings," id., and then specifically defines "impartial." Id. at
Canon IlI (a) (1).
54. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 3 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at http:/
/courts.michigan.gov/scao/resources/standards/odr/conduct.pdf; see S.C. CT. ANNEXED
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. app. B.II, available at http://www.scbar.org/public/
files/docs/ADRrules.pdf.
55. CAL. R. CT. 3.855(a), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/documents/
pdffiles/title_3.pdf (specifying that a "mediator must maintain impartiality toward all par-
ticipants in the mediation process at all times"); COLORADO MODEL STANDARDS OF CON-
DUCT FOR MEDIATORS II.B (Colo. Council of Mediators 1995), available at http://
www.courts.state.co.us/chs/court/mediation/modelstandards.pdf ("The mediator shall
conduct the mediation in an impartial manner and should avoid conduct that gives the
appearance of partiality."); IND. R. CT., RULES FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
7.4(C), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/adr/index.html#r7 ("A neutral
shall be impartial and shall utilize an effective system to identify potential conflicts of inter-
est at the time of appointment."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 37 app. A (2005) (Code of
Prof l Conduct for Mediators) (requiring a mediator to "maintain impartiality at all
times").
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process in an impartial manner. If at any time ... [mediators] are
unable to do so .. .[they should] withdraw from the mediation pro-
cess."56 These state Standards do not specifically define impartiality,
choosing to focus on conflict of interest concerns rather than media-
tor behavior.
3. Standards that Treat Impartiality as a Conflict of Interest
Consideration
Standards that focus on conflict of interest issues may prohibit a
mediator from taking part in a mediation where she is related to, or
employed by, one of the parties, 57 or may require the mediator to
disclose dealings or relationships that may raise questions about im-
partiality.58 Some Standards are more specific because they require a
mediator to disclose whether she provided prior services to any of the
participants59 or simply has had a personal or professional relation-
ship with one of the parties. 60 In some instances, a mediator is pre-
cluded from having an interest in the outcome of the dispute6' or
precluded from having a financial interest in the outcome other than
a fee arrangement.62 Without defining "impartiality," several Stan-
dards require mediators to disclose prior or existing affiliations with
any party and preclude any financial or other interest in the outcome
of the mediation. 63
Finally, some Standards take a more thorough approach and do
not commingle mediator impartiality with conflicts of interest. These
Standards set forth separate provisions for impartiality and conflicts of
interest.64
56. WISCONSIN ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 4.1 (Wis. Ass'n of
Mediators 1997), available at http://wamediators.org/pubs/ethicalquidelines.html.
57. IND. R. CT., RULES FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7.4(E).
58. COLORADO MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS II.A; WISCONSIN ETHI-
CAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 4.2.
59. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR IDAHO MEDIATORS 111.1 (Idaho Mediation Ass'n 2005),
available at http://www.idahomediation.org/sop.pdf.
60. CAL. R. CT. 3.855(b).
61. IND. R. CT., RULES FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7.4(E).
62. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR IDAHO MEDIATORS 111.4; see CAL. R. CT. 3.855 (b) (not-
ing that a mediator must inform participants about matters that may raise questions of
impartiality, including those of a "financial nature").
63. COLORADO MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 11; STANDARDS OF PRAC-
TICE FOR IDAHO MEDIATORS III.1, 4.
64. See, e.g., MARYLAND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS II, III (Md. Program
for Mediator Excellence 2006), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/macro/ap-
provedstandardsofconduct42006.pdf; Miss. CT. ANNEXED MEDIATION R. FOR CIV. LITIG.
XV.B, C, available at http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/rules/AllRuesText.asp?IDNum=37; NEW
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As exemplified from this sampling of Standards, principles of im-
partiality are not standardized. Some Standards define impartiality as
it relates to mediator conduct while others relate it more to conflict of
interest concerns. Still other Standards simply require a mediator to
be impartial, providing no guidance as to what constitutes impartiality
and allowing a great deal of room for individual interpretation. On
one hand, while a workable definition of impartiality is necessary, the
definition must take into account that mediation is a flexible, fluid
process. Nonetheless, the lack of clarity in many impartiality provi-
sions may encourage mediators to supply their own interpretations of
impartiality, which could undermine the integrity and credibility of
the mediation practice.
IH. Mediator Styles and Mediation Models
A mediator's orientation or approach to mediation may dictate
the style she uses. Style refers to the mediator's activities-her inter-
personal communications with, and behavior towards, all mediation
participants. 65 A mediator may adopt one or a combination of several
styles of mediation, and in fact, most mediators mix their styles and
techniques in individual mediations. 66
Many scholars have used descriptive words and phrases to define
mediator styles and mediation models. The three most common styles
are: "evaluative" and "facilitative," coined by Professor Leonard L. Ris-
JERSEY STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS IN COURT-CONNECTED PROGRAMS II, III (N.J.
Ass'n of Prof 1 Mediators 2000), available at http://njcourts.judiciary.state.nj.us/web0/no-
tices/reports/MediatorStandards.pdf; S.C. CT. ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
R. app. B.I, III, available at http://www.scbar.org/pdf/ADR/ADRrules.pdf; VIRGINA STAN-
DARDS OF ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS G, H (Judicial Council
of Va. 2005), available at http://www.nvms.us/PDFs/Ethics.pdf.
65. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Tech-
niques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 17 (1996) [hereinafter Riskin, Grid
for the Perplexed] (explaining that the vertical continuum of Riskin's mediation grid relates
to a mediator's activities, also known as her individual style).
66. See Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How-and Why-Legal Mediators Change
Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL. 41, 61 [hereinafter Golann, Variations in
Mediation] (concluding that mediators employ more than one style during any single medi-
ation and that part of the reason for the change may be due to the participants' personali-
ties and approaches); John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. Disp.
RESOL. 321, 321 [hereinafter Lande, Sophisticated Mediation Theory] (noting that mediators
appropriately and beneficially mix facilitative and evaluative techniques in the same media-
tion); Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADRi An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than
One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. DIsp. RESOL. 295, 297 (noting that mediators constantly move
between "facilitative-broad" and "evaluative-narrow" styles in one mediation session).
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kin, 67 and "transformative," coined by Professors Robert Baruch Bush
and Joseph Folger.68
Professor Riskin acknowledges inherent problems with his schol-
arship-problems that have created confusion and misunderstanding
of what he wanted to accomplish. As a result, he has proposed chang-
ing the words "evaluative" and "facilitative" to "directive" and "elici-
tive," respectively. 69 Professor Riskin's newer research emphasizes
mediator influences as well as influences by participants.7 0 For pur-
poses of this Article, however, references will continue to be made to
evaluative and facilitative styles since these terms are widely adopted
and used throughout the mediation field.
Professor Riskin and others acknowledge that many dynamics
may affect a mediator's style, including personal beliefs (predisposi-
tions), timing, participant influences, and the subject matter of the
mediation. 7 1 A mediator may be more evaluative in an employment
case and more facilitative in a neighborhood dispute. A mediator may
begin a mediation using facilitative techniques, and at the end of a
long day, urge the participants toward settlement using evaluative
techniques. A mediator may combine both styles by proposing several
alternatives in an evaluative style and then fostering communication
in a facilitative manner so that participants may discuss the proposal.
67. See Riskin, Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 65; Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orienta-
tions, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994). Professor
Riskin developed a grid based on two continuums. The horizontal continuum, categorized
as the Problem-Definition Continuum, recognizes the goals of the mediation. One end
represents a narrow view of the parties' goals, such as how much money to pay to a party.
The other end relates to a broad view of the goals. The broad view recognizes the eco-
nomic goal, but goes further by assessing underlying interests and how the parties may use
their interests creatively to transform the dispute. Riskin, Grid for the Perplexed, supra note
65, at 17. The vertical continuum relates to the mediator's activities or her individual style;
one end signifies an evaluative mediator while the other relates to a facilitative mediator.
Id.
68. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
69. Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003-2004) [hereinafter Riskin, Decisionmaking in
Mediation]. Professor Riskin believes that the new terminology more closely aligns with his
goal for the role-of-the-mediator continuum, which relates to the mediator's effect on party
self-determination. Id. at 30. Furthermore, he believes that "directive" is more descriptive
than "evaluative" because the former is more general and abstract, and therefore, may
cover a wider range of mediator activities. Id.
70. Id. at 34-51.
71. ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 375-431 (3d ed.
2002); Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation, supra note 69, at 34-41.
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Furthermore, mediator styles may relate to substantive issues as well as
process issues.72
In addition to the main mediator styles known as facilitative, eval-
uative, and transformative, other scholars refer to mediator styles and
mediation models based on personal behavior, commercial needs,
and legal or social norms. One must understand mediator behavior or
the type of mediation being conducted to be able to comprehend how
styles and models interact with impartiality requirements. The follow-
ing sections summarize many of the styles and models.
A. Facilitative Mediator Style
A facilitative mediation style emphasizes party interests and may
be referred to as interest-based mediation. 73 The facilitative mediator
is viewed as a third-party educator or facilitator; she seeks to empha-
size the parties' own problem solving, creativity, and personal evalua-
tions.74  The mediator encourages party attendance, facilitates
communication, poses questions to uncover the parties' underlying
needs and interests, helps educate the parties by assisting them to un-
derstand the other's needs and interests, and otherwise attempts to
provide a comfortable forum in which the parties can develop their
own creative solutions to a problem. 75
Facilitative mediation may seem therapeutic due to the process by
which it reaches an outcome-an emphasis on information and un-
derstanding to reach an agreement rather than through a mediator's
influence or coercion. 76 This mediation style is much more "touchy-
feely" than evaluative mediation. Hence, facilitative mediators may be
referred to as "'soft,' 'touchy-feely,' 'therapeutic,' 'potted plant,' or
'new age-y." 77
72. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediatzon, supra note 69, at 34-35.
73. Kenneth Fox, What Private Mediators Can Learn from the Peace-Builders, 7 CARDOZOJ.
CONFLICT RESOL. 237, 239 (2006).
74. Lande, Sophzsticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 321, 325; Lela P. Love, The
Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 937, 944-45
(1997).
75. Lande, Sophisticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 321, 322 ("Mediators using a
facilitative style focus on eliciting the principals' opinions and refrain from pressing their
own opinions about preferable settlement options."); Riskin, Grid for the Perplexed, supra
note 65, at 29-30, 32-34.
76. Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns About the Nature and
Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 268 (2001).
77. John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 850 (1997) [hereinafter Lande, Lawyering and Mediation
Transformation].
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A "productive-facilitative mediator" may have more expertise in
the general process of mediation rather than subject matter expertise,
though expertise regarding substantive issues may be another valuable
asset. 78 As a facilitative mediator approaches the narrow end of Ris-
kin's continuum, she may help the parties evaluate their proposals
through her questioning.79 Sometimes, the mediator may encourage
participants to brainstorm possible solutions.80
The facilitative mediator's goal is to avoid a directive approach
while concentrating on party empowerment and self-determination. A
facilitative mediator may act in a directive capacity to the extent the
mediator decides which questions to pose, which solutions to empha-
size, and how she engages the participants. Nevertheless, the facilita-
tive mediator should be capable of maintaining neutrality and
impartiality as long as she does not require participants to accept her
suggestions.
B. Evaluative Mediator Style
Margaret Shaw provides an insightful assessment of evaluative
mediators; they use a "continuum of behaviors" that include question-
ing regarding strengths and weaknesses of a case, providing informa-
tion, offering procedural or substantive advice, predicting possible
outcomes by a court adjudication, and suggesting ways to resolve a
dispute.81 Despite Shaw's assessment, scholars interpret an evaluative
style in diverse ways.
Some prefer that a mediator evaluate issue by issue.82 Others use
"less intrusive techniques" by recommending a "range of fair out-
comes."8 3 Under the latter method, an evaluative mediator predicts
how she thinks a fair and reasonable person might settle. Others pre-
fer the Socratic method of questioning. By posing questions in a way
to educate the parties, the mediator offers a reality check.84 An evalua-
tive mediator may go so far as to advocate for a particular settlement
78. Levin, supra note 76, at 268.
79. Riskin, Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 65, at 29.
80. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mediation, http://www.dwyersmith.com/media-
tion.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
81. James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and
Tentative Proposals, ftom an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 769, 774 (1997)
(citing Margaret L. Shaw, Evaluation Continuum, Prepared for Meeting of CPR Ethics
Commission (May 6-7, 1996) (on file with author)).
82. Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical
Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 479, 493 (2000).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 493-94.
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proposal. Irrespective of the various interpretations, an evaluative me-
diator becomes directive in her approach, no matter what aspect of
the mediation she emphasizes.8 5
Scholars refer to evaluative mediators as more directive in their
approach, coining such names as "'muscle mediators,' 'Rambo
mediators,' [and] 'Attila the mediator(s).' "86 In many instances, a me-
diator engages in an evaluative style for court-connected cases and
cases in which the parties are represented by counsel. The mediator
may attempt to influence the participants to adopt her opinion,8 7
which may compromise her neutrality and impartiality. Many view
these types of mediations as akin to a settlement conference.,,
C. Transformative Mediator Style
Over a decade ago, Professors Bush and Folger pioneered the
concept of a transformative mediator.89 While most mediations focus
on problem-solving outcomes, the transformative mediator offers a
different approach. She helps parties focus on their relationship
through their conflict interactions. 90 In doing so, the transformative
mediator helps the parties focus their communication on their con-
flict and how productive changes may affect the conflict.91
The shift is away from a problem-solving outcome and toward a
more open communication style; parties achieve "moral growth" by
emphasizing individual "empowerment and recognition."92 In other
words, "the emphasis is on shifts in parties' interaction, shifts from
relative weakness to greater strength (the empowerment dimension)
and movement from self-absorption to openness (the recognition di-
mension). 93 Recognition applies to a person's ability to empathize
and begin to understand the other party's perspectives and points of
view, not receiving recognition from another. 94
85. Riskin, Grid for the Peiplexed, supra note 65, at 27.
86. Lande, Lauyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 77, at 850.
87. Lande, Sophzsticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 322-23.
88. Levin, supra note 76, at 269.
89. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 5.
90. Id. at 82-83.
91. Joseph P. Folger, Mediation Research: Studying Transformative Effects, 18 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 385, 393 (2001).
92. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 5, at 2-12. The authors define "empowerment" as "the
restoration to individuals of a sense of their own value and strength and their own capacity
to handle life's problems." Id. at 2. "Recognition" is "the evocation in individuals of ac-
knowledgment and empathy for the situation and problems of others." Id.
93. Folger, supra note 91, at 393.
94. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 5, at 96.
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The transformative mediator encourages parties to define issues
and decide the terms of settlement themselves by helping them un-
derstand the other party's perspective. Through this style of media-
tion, the parties may grow, develop, and change their own
perspectives to become better human beings.95 Ultimately, transform-
ative mediation can transform the character of the individual dispu-
tants as well as society in general.96
Although transformative mediation does not accentuate problem-
solving, parties may settle an underlying dispute as part of their rela-
tional transformation. Hence, the transformative mediation style is
not mutually exclusive from the problem-solving approach seen in
facilitative and evaluative mediations. 97
D. Additional Mediation Styles and Models
As the mediation practice develops, some scholars venture out to
coin new terms to define a mediator's style or a mediation model.
This section summarizes some of the less commonly known terms.
Notwithstanding the varied terminology, most are analogous to either
facilitative or evaluative mediator styles.
1. "Trickster," "Magician," and "Prime Negotiator"
Robert D. Benjamin, a mediation practitioner and scholar, opines
that a mediator can be viewed as a "trickster" because she manages
and survives conflict rather than trying to defeat or stop it.98 The
"trickster-mediator" accomplishes this task by offering a "third per-
spective that shares traits of both sides of the dichotomy, thereby
transforming a conflicted dyad into a more harmonious triad."99 The
purpose behind the trickster-mediator seems appropriate because the
mediator reframes the conflict into an impartial third perspective. Yet,
the term "trickster" itself is offensive on its face when referring to a
mediator, and appears to conflict with a neutral third party's goal of
helping others reach peace and resolve conflict.
95. Id. at 2-12.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 11-12.
98. Robert D. Benjamin, Managing the Natural Energy of Conflict: Mediators, 7ricksters
and the Constructive Uses of Deception, in BRINGING PEACE INTO THE ROOM: How THE PERSONAL
QUALITIES OF A MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 79, 80 (Daniel
Bowling & David Hoffman eds., 2003). Benjamin writes: "[P]ersonality traits that best serve
mediators may not be the most obvious or commonly presented. They are as follows: (1)
confused, (2) voyeuristic, (3) compulsive, and (4) marginal." Id. at 84.
99. Id. at 95.
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Others have softened the trickster phraseology. ProfessorJohn W.
Cooley refers to mediators as "magicians." 10 0 James C. Freund refers
to mediators as "prime negotiator[s]" because he believes mediators
become an integral part of the negotiations that transpire during
mediations. 101
These scholars are correct on one hand because they refer to the
creativity and ingenuity necessary for mediators to reframe issues, add
an impartial third story, pose alternative solutions, and otherwise
think outside the box. On the other hand, the scholars may go too far
by emphasizing a third-party perspective that takes on a shape of its
own or the mediator's personal orientation. Irrespective of the label
given to the mediator's style, the mediator's directive approach may
infringe on the parties' rights of self-determination, which in turn may
affect the mediator's neutrality and impartiality.
2. Dictates of Commercial Needs
The commercial nature of the mediator's role may influence her
neutrality and impartiality, especially in light of whom she considers
to be her client. If a mediator considers attorney-advocates to be her
clients, she may assert a directive style that she thinks the attorneys
desire, in hopes of securing future business with them. A particular
style or technique may be important to the mediator who wants more
business and plans to sell her services based on her settlement record.
Business requirements also may be important to the party who is
searching for the type of mediator who will provide the best service
under the facts of a case. For example, in a highly specialized situation
such as a construction defect case involving many participants, the
parties and their attorneys may want an attorney-mediator or a retired
judge who has the expertise to provide a highly evaluative mediation.
Even when attorneys are not involved in the mediation, a mediator
may continue to exhibit the directive or evaluative style, although she
may be more amenable to a facilitative style by focusing on the parties'
underlying interests.
100. John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1997).
101. JAMES C. FREUND, THE NEUTRAL NEGOTIATOR: WHY AND How MEDIATION CAN
WORK TO RESOLVE DOLLAR DISPUTES 12-15 (1994) (noting that a mediation is really a ne-
gotiation in which the mediator becomes the "prime negotiator").
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In each situation, the mediator may attempt to appease clients to
obtain future referrals rather than focus on the process. 10 2 If the me-
diator exhibits favoritism toward a participant, she may jeopardize her
neutrality. The end result is that a client's commercial needs may dic-
tate the mediator's behavior in spite of the neutral approach set forth
in ethical Standards. 0 3 Commercial mediators' willingness to go be-
yond ethical guidelines is proof that the Standards, while well meant,
are not always followed.
Professor Bush addresses commercialism by examining a media-
tor's ability to sell her services and the corresponding need of the
client to know what he or she is getting when searching for a media-
tor.10 4 Rather than differentiate between evaluative and facilitative
mediators, Bush emphasizes mediator goals and describes mediators
as "'settlors,' 'fixers,' 'protectors,' 'reconcilors,' and 'empower-
ors.' "105
The settlor's job is to settle as many mediations as quickly as possi-
ble. 10 6 If this is the case, arguably a mediator will be directive in her
approach and may even cross the line to coerce the parties, knowing
the primary purpose is to settle the dispute.
The fixer mediator emphasizes problem solving through solu-
tions. Her goal is to relieve the parties of their problem while finding
a solution that is best for everyone.1 0 7 This type of mediator needs to
be creative and knowledgeable; more than likely, this mediator will
use a facilitative approach. The fixer mediator should be able to main-
tain neutrality and impartiality as long as she does not adopt the alter-
natives that she proposes.
The remaining types of mediators are "variants of the general
'fixer' species.' u08 Protectors strive to create a fair process, especially
for the weaker of the parties. They attempt to ensure that no one is
102. During the 2004 Annual Conference of the Association for Conflict Resolution, a
comment was made in one session that the mediator would do whatever was necessary for
the money.
103. See DEBORAH M. KOLB & KENNETH KRESSEL, THE REALITIES OF MAKING TALK WORK,
WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 461 (2001) (noting that mediators' needs to
sell themselves may result in them exerting "pressure tactics and arm twisting" which ulti-
mately jeopardizes their neutrality).
104. See Lande, Lawyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 77, at 851 (citing
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation 17-18 (1989) (unpublished
manuscript)).
105. Id.





hurt or taken advantage of through the mediation process. Sometimes
protectors go so far as to ensure that the final outcome is fair. 109 In an
attempt to help the weaker of the parties and ensure substantive fair-
ness of the outcome, observably the mediator steps out of her neutral
and impartial role. For as soon as a mediator begins to assist one party
to the disadvantage of the other party, a mediator is no longer neutral
and impartial.
Two final mediator types may conform to neutrality and imparti-
ality values. The reconcilor helps the parties concentrate on under-
standing each other and focuses on the quality of the mediation
rather than attempting a final settlement. Reconcilors are sometimes
referred to as "therapeutic" or "sensitive."' 10 Finally, some mediators
are empowerors because their goal is party self-determination. Em-
poweror mediators may generate options but remain detached from
them so that the parties may settle voluntarily. Some refer to this type
of mediator as a fixer who does not take a directive approach.11
Clearly, reconcilor and empoweror styles do not run afoul of neutral-
ity and impartiality.
3. "Michigan Mediation"
The Michigan style of mediation resembles arbitration because a
neutral third party renders a decision. In this type of mediation, court
rules require a neutral evaluation. Normally the court selects three
evaluators from a panel of attorneys. After reviewing written briefs and
hearing some argument from counsel, the panel makes an "award." 112
Although the award is not binding, the rejecting party will be sanc-
tioned if it fails to obtain a better result at trial.' 13
In 2000, the Michigan Supreme Court revised its Court Rules re-
garding Alternative Dispute Resolution primarily to change terminol-
ogy. 114 What was known as the "Michigan Mediation" pursuant to
Michigan Court Rule 2.403 changed when the term "mediation" was
changed to "case evaluation."'1 5 A new court rule, Rule 2.411, was ad-
ded to describe mediation using generally recognized principles con-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 853.
111. Lande, Lawyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 77, at 853.
112. See Laurence D. Connor, How to Combine Facilitatzon with Evaluation, 14 ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 15 (1996) (explaining the "Michigan Mediation" procedure).
113. Id.
114. See MICH. CT. R. 2.411 cmt.; see also id. at 2.403.
115. See MICH. CT. R. 2.411 cmt.; see also id. at 2.403.
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sistent with the definitions of mediation provided in Part II of this
Article. 116
Other variations of the traditional "Michigan Mediation" con-
tinue to exist. Florida has a statute that regulates Campus Master Plans
and Campus Development Agreements. 117 It requires that parties me-
diate disputes that arise while implementing executed campus devel-
opment agreements. 118 Pursuant to this mandate, each party selects a
mediator, and the two mediators in turn select a neutral third media-
tor. The panel of three mediators issues a recommendation to resolve
the dispute. 119
Attorney Laurence D. Connor uses a hybrid evaluation-facilita-
tion type of mediation similar to the "Michigan Mediation.' 20 He re-
fers to himself as a "special" mediator. 12' First he evaluates the
mediation in a similar manner to the "Michigan Mediation," although
he does not disclose his recommended award. 12 2 Then he begins the
second phase of the mediation using a facilitative style.' 23 During the
facilitative phase, Connor uses both joint sessions and private caucuses
and relies extensively on party involvement.' 24 If the parties cannot
settle the matter, Connor terminates the mediation and discloses his
award, including the reasons for it.125 Often, on the eve of trial, the
parties may rely on Connor's recommended award to settle the matter
between them.' 26 By disclosing his "award," Connor becomes highly
evaluative. Some believe such conduct impinges on mediator imparti-
ality. 127 On the other hand, he may be able to maintain impartiality by
simply divulging his opinion in the form of an "award" without forcing
the parties to accept it.
4. The Effect of Social Norms on Mediation
Societal roles may affect a mediator's style. Professor Ellen Wald-
man theorizes that mediations can be classified into "three separate
116. See MICH. CT. R. 2.411 cmt.; see also id. at 2.403.
117. FLA. STAT. § 240.155 (1998).
118. Id.
119. Id. Typically, however, Florida prohibits mediators of civil court cases from offer-
ing an opinion regarding a final court outcome.







127. See infra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
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models."' 128 First, the "norm-generating" model is seen as a traditional
mediation model that includes the typical stages of introduction,
storytelling, exchange of party views, generation and selection of op-
tions, and agreement writing. 129 The mediator reframes issues and
helps the parties manage their conflict. The parties establish their
own norms, so to speak, by creating solutions based on their personal
needs rather than social norms.
130
The second model is termed the "norm-educating" model.131 It is
basically the same as the norm-generating model except that the me-
diator goes farther by referring to "relevant social and legal norms."
132
The parties maintain autonomy by deciding whether or not their final
resolution conforms to the social or legal norms. This style of media-
tor looks like a broad facilitator under Riskin's grid. For example, in a
divorce mediation involving children, a mediator might refer to rele-
vant psychological studies concerning childrens' needs as well as legal
standards for the division of property.1 3 3 The "norm-educating" medi-
ator must be careful not to step over the line of neutrality and imparti-
ality. One can visualize a mediator doing so when helping to educate
the least powerful party. Thus, the mediator should carefully provide
the same information to all parties in her attempt to maintain neutral-
ity and impartiality.
The third model identified by Professor Waldman is the "norm-
advocating" model.1 34 Using the same basic stages and techniques of
the first two models, explains Professor Waldman, this mediator not
only educates the parties about relevant legal and ethical norms but
also mandates that these norms be incorporated into a final settle-
ment.13 5 Realizing that the norm-advocating model contradicts the
traditional vision of mediation, Professor Waldman cautions that the
model should be limited to situations in which one party is not capa-
ble of waiving certain rights or where the dispute affects society in
general.' 36 Although seldom used, the norm-advocating model is best
suited for mediations involving bioethical, zoning, environmental,
128. Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model
Approach, 48 HASTINrGS L.J. 703, 707 (1997).
129. Id. at 713.
130. Id. at 713-18.
131. Id. at 731-32.
132. Id. at 730.
133. Id. at 730, 731.
134. Id. at 742.
135. Id. at 745.
136. Id. at 753-54.
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and some discrimination disputes.13 7 This mediator style can be classi-
fied as a narrow evaluator under Riskin's grid. As long as the norm-
advocating mediator reinforces norms without regard to the particu-
lar needs of any one party, the mediator may be able to maintain her
impartiality.
IV. Analysis of the Tension Between Mediator Styles and
Impartiality Requirements
A. A Summary of the Problem Posed by the Research
Mediators are guided by written definitions and Standards, yet
their actual roles may be dictated by their own personal style, values,
and commercial needs in conjunction with the practical needs (or at
least the perceived practical needs) of the participants. A mediator's
style, or the model she employs in mediation, can affect the outcome
of the mediation.
Little empirical research exists to measure the effect of a media-
tor's style, although many scholars hypothesize about such effects.
One research project measured the extent to which evaluative and
facilitative mediators' styles affected party satisfaction and the amount
of money obtained by a mediated settlement.' 3 8 That research project
was limited to a study of evaluative versus facilitative mediator styles in
the context of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
("EEOC") mediation program.13 9 Another more generic study fo-
cused on four neutrals who worked on one simulated dispute. 140 The
study illustrated that mediators employ various styles within a single
mediation and that the final outcome of the mediation may be due in
part to a mediator's style combined with the disputants' personalities
and approaches. 141 A third study concluded that a mediator's style in
community mediations did not affect the final outcome. 142
137. Id. at 746.
138. E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, "What's Going On" in Mediation: An Empirical
Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator's Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary Benefit, 9 HARV.
NEGOT. L. Rrv. 75, 75 (2004).
139. Id. The authors' study focused on 645 employment law cases that were mediated
at the EEOC from March 1 toJuly 31, 2000. Id. at 75, 90. The study compared the results of
mediations conducted by evaluative and facilitative mediators and found, among other
findings, that the participants were most satisfied with a facilitated mediation and obtained
more monetary relief in an evaluative mediation in which the claimant was represented by
counsel. Id. at 95-105.
140. Id.
141. See Golann, Variations in Mediation, supra note 66, at 61.
142. See Lela P. Love &James B. Boskey, Should Mediators Evaluate? A Debate Between Lela
P. Love and James B. Boskey, 1 CARDOZO .ONLINE J. CONFLIcT RESOL. 1, 41, 96 (1997)
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As illustrated in Part II, many definitions of mediation include a
key provision that requires the mediator to serve as a neutral and im-
partial third party. More impressive is the fact that every set of Stan-
dards requires mediator impartiality. Nevertheless, specific mediator
styles and the commercial needs of the participants (whether attorney
advocates or disputing parties) actually can force a mediator out of
her neutral and impartial role.
The resulting dilemma is whether mediator impartiality require-
ments can and should apply to all types of mediator styles. The follow-
ing Part IV.B examines how mediator styles can impact a mediator's
duties of impartiality and neutrality.
B. The Effect that Styles Have on a Mediator's Neutrality and
Impartiality
A mediator's involvement in the mediation readily can be seen
when comparing different mediator styles. Irrespective of the differ-
ences in styles, 143 mediators may interpret the same styles differently.
Some who say that they are facilitative mediators actually may en-
gage in evaluative techniques and vice versa. Some mediators may
confuse style with strategies or tactics when referring to their ap-
proach. When describing a particular style such as facilitative or evalu-
ative, the mediator should be cognizant of whether that style applies
to the process, the substance, or both. Some mediators who espouse
an evaluative mediation style may overstep their bounds by interject-
ing their personal opinions and values to the same extent that a settle-
ment judge exhibits during a mandatory settlement conference.
These variances in interpretation need to be considered when exam-
ining the effect that styles have on a mediator's neutrality and imparti-
ality. Furthermore, a mediator's impartiality cannot exist in a vacuum;
it affects other mediation values, most notably party self-determina-
tion. This section is divided into subparts aligned with the three main
mediator styles, including analogous counterparts.
1. Facilitative Style
The facilitative category of mediators includes Riskin's classifica-
tion of a facilitative mediator as well as others classified as fixer,14
4
(citing DANIEL McGILLIS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY MEDIATION PROGRAMS: DEvEL-
OPMENTS AND CHALLENGES (1997)), http://www.cojcr.org/vollnol/article01.html.
143. See supra Part III.
144. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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reconcilor, 45 empoweror,14 6 norm-generating, 147 and norm-educat-
ing. 148 A facilitative mediator emphasizes the needs and interests of
the parties and reinforces the concept of self-empowerment. The
facilitative mediator should be able to perform this task while main-
taining her neutrality and impartiality, especially when the mediator is
seen as a "process person" who does not contribute substantive infor-
mation 1 49 and the ultimate goal is problem-solving rather than settle-
ment of issues.
Some scholars criticize the facilitative mediator because her pas-
sivity may lead to an uneven balance of power between the partici-
pants. 150 Professor Jeffrey Stempel is concerned that a facilitative
mediator passively allows the stronger party to control the weaker
party.15 1 Such a scenario can occur in mediations where the mediator
is serving in a purely facilitative manner and the parties have diver-
gent levels of power. Yet, if the mediator attempts to balance the
power between the participants, certainly she will assume a partial role
and violate impartiality requirements.
Another criticism can be raised: If a mediator fails to balance the
parties' relative power, she may violate some Standards that require
her to do so. 15 2 The problem becomes one in which a facilitative me-
diator's style may infringe on requirements in Standards, creating the
mediator's dilemma.
A possible solution might be that the facilitative mediator concen-
trate on a specific problem by empowering both participants rather
than attempting to balance the parties' relative power. This solution
might work for some facilitative mediators, but not necessarily all of
them. The mediator's dilemma may persist for these other mediators,
especially due to the passive imbalance of power.
145. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
149. See Love & Boskey, supra note 142, para. 41 (reflecting on James Boskey's summa-
rization of Lela Love's writings that a mediator is "purely a process person and does not
contribute substantive information to the process other than agenda structuring," and not-
ing his disagreement with Love's position).
150. Lande, Sophisticated Mediatzon Theory, supra note 66, at 326.
151. Id.
152. See Exon, Why Ethical Standards Create Chaos, supra note 26, at app A. Appendix A




a. General Criticisms of the Evaluator Style
An ongoing debate exists regarding evaluative mediators. Many
scholars criticize the evaluative mediator for crossing the neutral/im-
partial threshold. Professors Kimberlee Kovach and Lela Love refer to
evaluative mediation as an "oxymoron."'153 They advocate for media-
tor regulation rather than "unfettered evaluations and assessments" of
a case. 154 They argue that a mediator's evaluative style jeopardizes her
neutrality because any assessment will, in all likelihood, favor one
party to the detriment of the other.155 Once neutrality is jeopardized,
so is a party's trust in the mediator. The disfavored party may with-
draw from the mediation or actually feel as though the mediation en-
vironment has become antagonistic because the disfavored party
becomes angry, hurt, or alienated. 156
Some critics argue that evaluative mediators may engage in un-
ethical conduct.157 Some argue that by evaluating the substance of the
mediation, the mediator interferes with party self-determination.15 8
Others counter that the mediator's evaluation actually enhances party
self-determination by helping parties change the way they think.159
153. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, "Evaluative"
Mediation is an Oxymoron].
154. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Medi-
ation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization , 6 HARv. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2001) (citing Ko-
vach & Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, supra note 153).
155. Id. at 31.
156. Kimberlee K_ Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid,
3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 101 (1998) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation]
(advocating that mediators should not use an evaluative style); Love, supra note 74, at 937,
940, 945 (contending that evaluative mediators promote "adversarial behaviors" such as
positioning and polarization and can actually stop the negotiation process). Contra Lande,
Lauyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 77, at 874-76 (explaining that an evalua-
tive mediator does not necessarily impair his or her impartiality).
157. Brian Wessner, A Uniform National System of Mediation in the United States: Requiring
National Training Standards and Guidelines for Mediators and State Mediation Programs, 4 CAR-
DOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 44 (2002), http://www.cojcr.org/vol4nol/
notes0l.html (noting that a mediator will engage in unethical and immoral conduct if she
evaluates and has no legal background).
158. Lela P. Love & John W. Cooley, The Intersection of Evaluation by MEDIATORS and
Informed Consent: Warning the Unwary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 45, 58 (2005)
(acknowledging that party self-determination may be impacted to the extent the parties
adhere to the mediator's evaluation).
159. See Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or
Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 675 (1997) (noting that "protections against violating prin-
ciples of self-determination and impartiality are sufficient to protect the parties").
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Some critics contend that an evaluative mediator engages in the unau-
thorized practice of law.160 Still others contend that an evaluation can
lead to an adverse effect in the way the mediator delivers an evalua-
tion. For example, if an evaluation is given in ajoint session, the party
on the losing end may "resist" the evaluation and stop listening in an
effort to save face. 161
Another criticism is that evaluative mediators may inhibit parties
from engaging in their own problem-solving methods. 162 The media-
tor may re-orient the dispute towards her preferences rather than the
participants' creativity.163 Opponents contend that rather than pro-
vide an evaluative assessment, the mediator should encourage the par-
ties to understand each other, become creative, and seek to solve their
own problems. 164 Nevertheless, even some proponents caution that a
mediator's evaluation should be used to assist the facilitative process
rather than serve as the sole source of the mediation style. 165
Professor Riskin acknowledges that as a mediator becomes more
directive in her approach, she may become biased and appear incapa-
ble of maintaining her neutrality.166 Proponents, however, argue that
a mediator has to include some element of evaluation in her style.
Although the debate continues, some scholars believe that we must
examine what really occurs during a mediation, as opposed to what
should occur.167
b. Effects of Related Evaluative Styles
Often a mediator's style affects her ability to maintain impartial-
ity, no matter how the style is coined. Whether termed evaluative, 168
directive, 69 trickster,1 70 magician,1 7 ' prime negotiator, 72 settlor, 173
160. McDermott & Obar, supra note 138, at 77.
161. See Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14 ALTER
NATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 62 (1996) (advocating that a mediator provide an evaluation
in private sessions to maintain neutrality and help the losing party from losing face).
162. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 156, at 103 (noting that "O]udging
blocks the imagination").
163. Id. at 103-04.
164. Kovach & Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, supra note 153, at 31.
165. See Love & Boskey, supra note 142, at para. 51 (articulating Boskey's feelings of
discomfort at the idea that a mediator's sole tool will be evaluative techniques).
166. Riskin, Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 65, at 47-48; see Aaron, supra note 161, at
62 (noting that when a mediator evaluates a case, the party on the losing side may perceive
the mediator's lack of neutrality and begin to view the mediator more as an adversary).
167. McDermott & Obar, supra note 138, at 77-78.
168. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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protector, 174 norm-advocating, 1 75 or Michigan Mediation,1 76 these
types of mediators easily can exceed their neutral and impartial
responsibility.
In each case, these types of mediators may influence parties to
adopt a position that the mediator thinks is rational or best for every-
one involved in the mediation. At the very least, when a mediator eval-
uates the dispute, her opinion usually favors one party over the other,
which arguably jeopardizes her impartiality.177 In some instances, and
most notably with the protector mediator, a mediator may attempt to
ensure a fair result. To the extent that a mediator inserts herself into
the dispute, she begins to advocate for the benefit of one party rather
than for all parties, which jeopardizes her impartiality. The traditional
Michigan Mediation is an extreme example. It clearly obstructs party
empowerment since a panel of three attorneys renders an opinion,
and the parties are required to take it or leave it. Once the panel
renders an opinion in favor of one party, it compromises the princi-
ples of neutrality and impartiality by taking sides.
c. Effects of Attempts to Balance Power
The late Professor James Boskey argued that a mediator might
want to use evaluative techniques to help "level the playing field"
where oppression is apparent, such as when a power imbalance exists
in the process.178 He contended that the parties cannot enter into a
"truly voluntary" agreement if one or both have some factual misun-
derstanding. 179 He also acknowledged that a mediator can avoid the
appearance of partiality if she offers an evaluation in a joint session
rather than a private caucus.' 80 Despite Boskey's well-reasoned opin-
ion, his scenario is a specific example of a mediator exceeding her
neutral and impartial role by attempting to assist the weaker, or at
least the perceived weaker, of the parties.
171. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
177. See Love & Boskey, supra note 142, at para. 21 (noting Love's position that
mediators should not evaluate because they jeopardize their neutrality).
178. Id. at para. 60.
179. Stark, supra note 81, at 792 (citing to James Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator:
Rational Assessment, Not Pressure, 1994 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 370).
180. Love & Boskey, supra note 142, at para. 92.
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Other scholars also are concerned about the mediator's involve-
ment in the participants' power balance.181 As previously discussed,
Professor Jeffrey Stempel is concerned that a facilitative mediator pas-
sively allows the stronger party to control the weaker party. 18 2 Profes-
sor John Lande acknowledges Stempel's fear, yet believes that a
mediator can equally side with the stronger party, aggravating the dis-
tribution of power problems which are at the heart of Stempel's ap-
prehension.1 83 Regardless, once the mediator attempts to equalize the
parties' power, she loses her ability to maintain neutrality and
impartiality.
d. Informed Decision-Making and a Final Outcome
As an evaluative mediator becomes an "activist"-one who takes
control of the mediation by advising parties how to proceed' 1 4-her
impartiality begins to wane.18 5 Such a scenario does not bother Profes-
sor James Stark because he believes in the mediator's ability to dis-
close information, even at the risk of appearing biased, to ensure the
parties are making an informed decision.' 8 6 He does not believe that
the mediator's impartiality is at issue.'8 7
Professor Susskind, on the other hand, suggests that while the
"activist" mediator is not neutral, she remains "nonpartisan" as to the
outcome.' 8 8 In other words, the activist mediator advocates for the
best "possible outcome" while remaining disinterested in the individ-
ual parties. 189 By taking a personal interest only in the outcome of the
mediation, the mediator guides and controls or otherwise trains the
parties on how to focus on alternative solutions to advance their re-
spective interests. Professor Maureen Laflin has added her own criti-
cisms to the mix:
181. Lande, Sophisticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 326.
182. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
183. Lande, Sophisticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 326.
184. See Laflin, supra note 82, at 491 (noting that the "[a]ctivist, evaluative ADR" takes
control of the outcome of the mediation process and this should not be connoted as medi-
ation because it is more "akin to neutral evaluation").
185. The panel's award in the Michigan Mediation constitutes an extreme activist me-
diator. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
186. Stark, supra note 81, at 796 (noting that the dilemma between party informed
consent and the appearance of mediator bias is not the same thing as a conflict between
competing values of informed consent and mediator impartiality).
187. Id. at 796-97 (advocating that the mediator provide enough information to the
parties to be "reasonably informed," not necessarily fully informed).




Yet mediators who see their role as one of training the parties, no
matter how impartial they may be, are paternalistic. And mediators
who approach the process as "advocates of a good solution" are
necessarily adopting an attitude of power and control over the out-
come, an attitude which cannot but compromise the principles of
self-determination and impartiality.' 9 0
Both Professors Susskind and Laflin make credible, yet flawed,
arguments. First, by taking an interest in the substantive outcome of
the mediation, a mediator may affect party self-determination. The
problem is not solved by simple semantics such as using the terms
"guide," "control," or "train" to describe the methods used to get par-
ties to focus on their own interests in creating a workable solution.
Any attempt to guide, control, or train parties can lead the parties to
pursue the mediator's interest rather than their own.
Second, Professor Laflin goes too far in her argument because
she contends that a mediator's ability to "advocate . . .a good solu-
tion" always compromises self-determination and impartiality. 19 1 This
is not always the case. A mediator must remain neutral and impartial
to both the parties' interests and the outcome of the mediation. If a
mediator crafts her words carefully, she may offer solutions or advice
without compromising the parties' problem-solving abilities or her
own neutrality and impartiality.
A related criticism relates to an evaluative mediator's substantive
advice and how that advice affects the final outcome of a mediation.
The advice can pose particular problems if the mediator believes that
the law dictates the standard of fairness in mediations. As a result, an
evaluative mediator may seek to promote fairness by attempting to
predict a legal outcome. 192 Some scholars contend that an evaluative
mediator's emphasis on the legal outcome implies that a legal solu-
tion is the best outcome for the dispute. 193 Professor Lande contends
that "this presumes that the legal rules provide firm results, the rules
are reasonably clear, judges and juries consistently follow the rules,
and mediators can accurately assess the likely results. ' 19 4 Lande makes
a sound argument that often cases go to mediation because the law is
not clear, and the ability to predict a likely litigation outcome is diffi-
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Lande, Sophisticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 326.
193. See Levin, supra note 76, at 271 ("Evaluation turns the process away from problem
solving toward an adversarial contest-sharing turns to posturing.... Moreover, too much
emphasis on a likely legal outcome overlooks the possibility that the legal solution is not
necessarily the best solution.").
194. Lande, Sophtsticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 326.
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cult.1 9 5 The evaluative mediator, therefore, may create a social injus-
tice by providing an incorrect prediction.
19 6
e. The Overly Zealous Evaluator
Mediation can reach an extreme level when the mediator strives
to establish a settlement agreement using fear or pressure to the ex-
tent that it constitutes undue influence 197 or coercion. 198 Professors
Nancy A. Welsh and Carrie Menkel-Meadow are wary about a media-
tor's overly-zealous conduct. 19 9
One can visualize how a mediator might begin to assert undue
influence by comparing the traditional judicial settlement conference
with mediation. In the former, the parties are presented with a poten-
tial settlement arrangement and are given an opportunity to passively
accept or reject it. With mediation, the concept of party self-determi-
nation means that the parties dominate the dispute resolution process
by creating options and solutions, controlling the substantive discus-
sions, and deciding on a final settlement.20 0 Even though mediation is
based on party empowerment, it also requires active mediator partici-
pation in the process. As a mediator becomes more directive or ag-
gressive, she may try to influence the parties, thus affecting party
control.
Examples of coercive conduct include scenarios where the media-
tor forces the parties to remain in session well into the evening hours
without adequate food, strong-arming the parties to continue mediat-
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. "Undue influence" is defined as "unfair persuasion of a party who is under the
domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation be-
tween them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner inconsistent
with his welfare." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1) (2003).
198. "Coercion" has been described as a higher form of pressure than "undue influ-
ence" because it "works on mental, moral, or emotional weakness." Odorizzi v. Bloomfield
Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (Ct. App. 1966). The two terms also have been distin-
guished because "undue influence" is based on some type of "confidential relationship"
whereas such a relationship is not necessary in a coercive situation. Id. at 540; see Lonnie
Chunn, Note, Duress and Undue Influence-A Comparative Analysis, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 572,
576-77 (1970).
199. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 407, 411-12
(1997) ("One of the most troubling of our ethical dilemmas in ADR [is determining] when
is a solution suggested .. .by a third party neutral too coercive on the parties."); Welsh,
supra note 154, at 7, 15 (referring to the "thinning vision of party self-determination in
court-connected mediation" and noting that the principle of party self-determination is
different in mediation as opposed to a traditional judicial settlement conference).
200. See Welsh, supra note 154, at 16-18.
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ing until a final settlement is reached, failing to provide sufficient
time for the parties to reflect on the adequacy of a final agreement, or
emphasizing the mediator's opinion regarding the legal outcome if
the case went to litigation. 201
f. Current Suggestions for the Evaluative Mediators
A long-standing debate has focused on how a mediator should
evaluate a dispute. Scholars have suggested many solutions to help
ease the tension created by the foregoing criticisms. The evaluative
mediator can maintain neutrality and impartiality by providing the
same assessment to all disputing parties. The mediator must act with-
out coercion. A mediator can accomplish these goals by offering her
assessment in a joint session, after the parties request the evalua-
tion.202 Alternatively, if a mediator renders opinions in separate
caucuses, she also can maintain neutrality and impartiality by simply
providing an invited assessment without pushing any party to adopt a
specific course of conduct. Arguably, a neutral and impartial mediator
can evaluate a case by rendering a personal opinion based on her par-
ticular expertise but at the same time not force it on any party. Profes-
sor Riskin goes so far as to contend that if a lawyer mediator discusses
legal ramifications with the parties in a neutral manner, this may actu-
ally diffuse advocacy because parties may not feel the need to bring in
their own lawyers. 20 3 Another approach is for the mediator to distance
herself from the parties when offering advice; she can do this by pre-
dicting what an individual lawyer, judge, or jury might advise in a par-
ticular situation,20 4 or by calling in a "specialist. '" 20 5
201. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
202. See Lande, Lawyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 77, at 874-76 (con-
tending that a mediator does not affect her impartiality when she expresses an opinion
about a likely court outcome or typical resolutions of similar disputes, especially when the
opinion or evaluation is invited by the parties).
203. Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26
Aiuz. L. REV. 329, 335 (1984) [hereafter Riskin, Toward New Standards] (noting that a neu-
tral lawyer who serves as a mediator may provide legal information in such a way that the
parties will not feel the need to hire independent counsel who may influence the process,
which results in the parties' ability to reach their own agreement without relying on the
lawyers' perspectives).
204. Id. at 336; GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, supra note 8, § 10.6.9 (noting that
a mediator can predict what a judge or jury might find in terms of damages and liability
rather than make a personal statement such as, "I think there should be a liability finding
here").
205. GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, supra note 8, § 10.3.3. To maintain her cred-
ibility and rapport with the participants, the mediator may call in a "specialist" to render a
formal evaluation. This method prevents any perceived association with one party, avoids
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Scholars like Dwight Golann and Marjorie Corman Aaron have
written extensively on the subject of how an evaluative mediator can
remain neutral, offering a variety of suggestions. 20 6 First and foremost,
they caution that a mediator should not comment on the substance of
the mediation; she should remain passive. 20 7 In addition to the fore-
going discussion, they contend that a mediator can remain neutral by
using a Socratic method of questioning, 208 carefully selecting phrase-
ology that is devoid of her point of view,209 evaluating the merits of a
"no agreement" alternative, 210 paying attention to the timing in which
the evaluation is rendered,211 and considering the dynamics of evalu-
ating in a joint session or in a private caucus. 212
The current suggestions provide guidance to evaluative
mediators, but fall short of practical solutions. The suggestions are
limited solely to evaluative mediators. They fail to consider the ten-
sions that are developing as new Standards are created, especially
when the Standards include fairness provisions such as balancing
antagonism by the perceived loser, and equalizes the playing field from the mediator's
perspective. Id.
206. GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, supra note 8.
207. Id. § 10.1.
208. Id. § 10.2. By leading the parties through a process to evaluate their own case, the
mediator helps them formulate their own evaluation of the case while maintaining her
neutrality. Id.
209. Id. § 10.5. To maintain a level of credibility-the trust and rapport that a mediator
may engender during the mediation-she needs to cautiously pose questions. The media-
tor should carefully select the phraseology so that she does not reveal her point of view. A
good way to do this is to pose questions in a joint session and direct them to all parties
equally. Id.
210. Id. § 10.4. A mediator may provide a neutral evaluation regarding the value and
merits of a "no-agreement" alternative. The mediator does not interfere with the partici-
pants' creativity, ability to generate options, and responsibility to formulate their own reso-
lution of a dispute because the no-agreement alternative evaluation does not seek to
resolve the dispute. Id
211. Id. § 10.5. A mediator has a better chance of maintaining neutrality if she waits
longer to express her evaluation. As a result, she can: learn more about the parties, facts,
and case; gain a better understanding of the attorneys' positions; and build trust and rap-
port with the participants. Id.
212. Id. § 10.6.1. Some scholars advocate for mediator evaluation in a joint session so
that all participants hear the same thing. Sometimes if an evaluation is presented in ajoint
session, the losing party will lose face and focus on the evaluation without moving forward
in the mediation process, believing that the mediator's neutrality may be jeopardized. Id.
Others believe the best way to evaluate a case is during private sessions because the media-
tor may need to present her evaluation differently to suit participants' personalities and
corporate cultures. Also, the mediator can alleviate potential animosity by presenting her
evaluation in private caucuses. Id. Both positions-evaluating in private caucuses or in a
joint session-are valid and show how the timing and logistics of delivering an evaluation
impact a mediator's neutrality.
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power, ensuring informed decision-making, and ensuring a substan-
tively fair outcome. Quite simply, the current solutions exacerbate the
mediator's dilemma because they are limited to one mediator style,
restricted in scope by applying only to methods to provide a neutral
evaluation. The current solutions do not address the impact that de-
veloping Standards have on mediator styles or the interrelated nature
of many of the various mediation values set forth in Standards.
3. Transformative Style
A transformative approach to mediation means that the mediator
is less likely to be directive in terms of solving a problem because she
does not influence the final outcome. Rather, the mediator may be
directive in terms of communication as she enables the parties to con-
trol the decisions regarding their outccme. In this regard, a trans-
formative mediator easily can remain impartial because she does not
influence the outcome, as so often happens in a problem-solving
approach. 2 13
V. Recommendations to Alleviate the Tension Between
Mediator Styles and Impartiality Requirements
It is readily apparent that all types of mediators cannot conform
to impartiality requirements in Standards. Conversely impartiality re-
quirements found in Standards cannot apply uniformly to all media-
tor styles. The majority of the analysis and recommendations relate to
facilitative and evaluative mediator styles and their related counter-
parts because a transformative mediator always can remain impartial.
The current debate regarding suitable mediator conduct needs
to continue, albeit with a new focus. Rather than limit the discussion
to methods of proper evaluation in mediation, scholars, mediators,
regulators, and legislators need to focus the current debate towards
appropriate compliance with impartiality provisions and the simulta-
neous use of practical mediator styles and conduct. The following four
alternatives address the mediator's dilemma-how can a mediator be
neutral and impartial when engaged in certain mediation styles?
A. Alternative 1: The No-Action Approach to Developing
Impartiality Requirements
Currently, thirteen states do not have Standards even though
most of these jurisdictions recognize and embrace the benefits of me-
213. BuSH & FOLGER, supra note 5, at 104-06.
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diation. 214 Common reasons for not developing ethical Standards are
that: (1) the mediation industry is prematurely developed in a particu-
lar state; and (2) the tension between mediation values and traditional
mediator styles is too great to enable the development of a set of Stan-
dards with the clarity necessary to be instructive to the practicing me-
diator.21 5 The absence of Standards means that a jurisdiction may
have no rules regarding impartiality.
Consequently, the first alternative is the no-action alternative,
which means that states that currently lack ethical Standards should
not yet develop them. Even though a state may lack a set of Standards,
Alternative 1 may be superfluous if a state statute or court rule defines
mediation by incorporating impartiality requirements.
Before enacting comprehensive Standards, the states should thor-
oughly analyze the mediator's dilemma-the conflict between media-
tor styles and the ability to simultaneously maintain mediator
impartiality. While developing Standards, states should take into ac-
count the various mediator styles and how each may affect mediator
impartiality. The states may want to consider Alternatives 2, 3, or 4 as
they develop their own ethical Standards.
Alternative 1 should not apply to states that already have enacted
Standards because these states have spent years working on the best
possible set of ethical guidelines. They would suffer an extreme disser-
vice if they were told to cancel everything and start anew. States that
already have Standards should consider Alternatives 2, 3, or 4.
B. Alternative 2: Redefine Mediation to Remove the Requirement
of Mediator Impartiality
Several scholars theorize that a mediator cannot be impartial.
Robert D. Benjamin contends that rather than being objective and
neutral, mediators should be "balanced" in their communications
with parties to protect both parties rather than either one.216 Benja-
min theorizes that a mediator cannot be neutral since she becomes
part of the system, 217 yet his proposition seems extreme.
214. This Author is unable to locate general civil Standards, whether court-connected
or by a professional organization, for the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut,
Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Is-
land, and South Dakota.
215. Exon, Why Ethical Standards Create Chaos, supra note 26, at 418.
216. ROBERT D. BENJAMIN, Understanding "Operative Mythology," in THE EFFECTIVE NEGO-




Although Benjamin makes an interesting argument that the me-
diator becomes part of the system, conceivably the mediator can con-
tinue to be neutral as long as she does not offer alternatives or advice
that benefit only one party. For example, a mediator who, with the
participants' approval, offers an opinion regarding the merits of the
case and a probable outcome, may not lose her impartiality as long as
she does not urge the parties to adopt this position.218 Benjamin's
approach seems to apply to evaluative mediators, implying that
facilitative mediators can be impartial.
Semantics aside, whether a mediator employs balancing or evalu-
ative techniques, the dilemma persists. Can the mediator conduct the
mediation pursuant to impartiality requirements and simultaneously
maintain any mediator style?
Professor John Lande believes in the eclectic nature of media-
tion.219 He makes a sensible argument that existing mediation values,
such as confidentiality and neutrality, may not be absolutely
necessary. 220
Another problem is that mediators may use an evaluative style
unconsciously. An ethical rule that completely prohibits such tech-
niques could create an "unfair ethical [trap] for unwary parties and
mediators."221
Despite the traditional definitions of mediation which rely on key
values such as party self-determination and mediator impartiality, in-
dustry standards and commercial dictates appear to be driving the
profession in a new direction. Ethical Standards illustrate a new trend
toward a fair result and related fairness concepts, such as ensuring
informed decisions and balancing power-aspirational concepts that
are not part of the traditional definitions of mediation. 222 Promoting
fairness under any style or model of mediation creates tension with
mediator impartiality.
218. Lande makes a similar observation. See, e.g., Lande, Lawyering and Mediation Trans-
formation, supra note 77, at 876.
219. Lande, Sophisticated Mediation Theory, supra note 66, at 333 (agreeing with Jeffrey
Stempel's "preference for eclectic approaches by mediators").
220. Id. at 332-33 (acknowledging that many effective mediators have some ties to the
disputing participants, such as mediators who are members of organizations, tribes, and
communities connected to the participants, Postal Service mediators involved in employ-
ment cases, and ombuds who are employed by a participating organization).
221. Carl T. Hahn, Using Evaluative Techniques: The Virginia Approach, 16 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 149 (1998).
222. Exon, Why Ethical Standards Create Chaos, supra note 26, at 419.
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The tendency to embrace fairness concepts means that the medi-
ation field is changing. The definition of mediation should change
accordingly. Other than potential conflicts of interest, why should a
mediator remain neutral and impartial?
The answer lies with Alternative 2: the definition of mediation
should be broadened to refer to a conciliatory process of using a third
party to assist disputants to reach a desired goal. The new definition of
mediation is generic enough to apply to many different mediator
styles. The reference to a "desired goal" is adequately flexible to apply
to issue deciding, problem solving, and relational objectives-goals in-
dicative of evaluative, facilitative, and transformative mediators or any
variation of these main mediator styles.
The new, simplified definition of mediation also removes require-
ments of mediator impartiality other than conflict of interest con-
cerns. Concurrently, existing Standards would need to be modified to
delete the requirements of mediator impartiality. By removing impar-
tiality requirements from corresponding Standards, regulators would
enable any and all types of mediator styles and mediation models to
comply simultaneously with the broader definition of mediation and
the simplified Standards. All mediator styles, therefore, could stand
side-by-side with ethical Standards that have deleted requirements of
mediator impartiality.
Some scholars may contend that Alternative 2 is impractical and
severe because it appears to push the mediation field backward rather
than allow it to progress forward. They may argue that mediation is
flexible enough to sustain existing definitions of mediation or that
ethical opinions can fill the chasms left open by the inadequacies or
inconsistencies of Standards.2 23
Professor Michael Moffitt might criticize the broadened defini-
tion of mediation, arguing it is not helpful if a descriptive definition
lacks the dual components of structure and behavior. 224 According to
Professor Moffitt, defining mediators as "third parties, not otherwise
involved in a controversy, who assist disputing parties in their negotia-
tions," provides a structural component which identifies the mediator
yet fails to limit the broad, sweeping nature of the description to the
223. See Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR and
AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPrAL. J.L. 195, 197-98, 200
(2006) (acknowledging that the revised Model Standards provide guidance and serve as a
foundational framework for states that do not yet have mediation standards and advocating
reliance on advisory or ethics opinions for more detailed assistance).
224. Michael Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 I-IHAv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 69, 89 (2005).
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mediation field.225 Furthermore, he contends such a definition says
"little."2 26
Professor Moffitt's potential criticism fails to take into account
that current definitions of mediator-such as "distributive mediator,"
"facilitative mediator," "community mediator," "family law mediator,"
and so forth-are qualified. Each qualifying word enhances the be-
havioral component that may appear lacking in the simplified defini-
tion of mediation offered in Alternative 2. Additionally, the definition
of "mediator" signifies its limited scope to the mediation field.
Professor Moffitt's concern that a broadened definition of media-
tion arguably extends to anyone who attempts to resolve a controversy
fails to acknowledge other practical difficulties. Without a mandate
for mediator licensing, anyone may fit the third party characterization
of the simplified definition of mediation. Standards become a critical
component to help qualify the special goals and values of mediation.
A definition, standing alone, cannot serve as the all-encompassing
guide for the mediation practice. It can, however, serve as a flexible
point of beginning that does not collide with impartiality
requirements.
Additionally, none of the potential criticisms takes into account
that most jurisdictions lack enforcement mechanisms. A few states,
such as Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina, have specific mecha-
nisms in place to enforce ethical obligations of mediators and address
consumer complaints about mediator conduct.227 Until standardized
enforcement mechanisms are commonplace, ethical Standards must
be adequate to specifically address the mediator's dilemma regarding
mediator style and impartiality.
C. Alternative 3: Redefine Mediation to Suit Mediator Styles-The
Contract Approach
Another approach is to differentiate between the two main medi-
ator styles-evaluative and facilitative-and redefine them as separate
and independent processes. Rather than broaden the definition of
mediation to encompass all types of mediator styles, Alternative 3 pro-
poses the creation of two distinct types of mediation, each with its own
narrowed definition.
225. Id. at 88-89.
226. Id. at 89.
227. See Young, supra note 223, at n.240.
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A facilitative as well as transformative mediation could remain as
the conventional definition of mediation. It would include the tradi-
tional values of party self-determination and mediator impartiality.
Evaluative mediation could be redesignated as its own process
called a "Mediated Settlement Conference." The evaluative mediator
would not need to behave in a neutral and impartial demeanor. She
could engage in all types of evaluative techniques except for coercive
conduct.
In conjunction with the modified definitions of mediation, the
parties could be presented with a menu of mediator behaviors that
they would embrace. This is where mediator styles come into play.
Presented with a brief description of evaluative, directive, facilitative,
elicitive, empoweror, fixer, and norm-educating styles, compartmen-
talized within either definition, the parties could assert true control
over the process by defining how they want their mediator to act and
their process to be conducted.
Alternative 3 provides both clarity and uniformity in the media-
tion process because it will satisfy the disputing parties' needs and in-
terests, the mediator's personal values and commercial needs, and the
guiding principles set forth in written definitions and Standards. By
allowing the participants to handle such preliminary matters before
the mediation session begins, participants in essence enter into a con-
tract to select the mediator style and the process. 2 28 In turn, the par-
ties truly determine the outcome of the mediation from both a
procedural and substantive perspective.
To allow parties an opportunity to select the process of their
choice, it is necessary to educate them before they engage in the me-
diation process. The parties need to know what a mediator can and
should do. The parties need to understand the concept of mediator
styles229 along with the corresponding processes of either mediation
or Mediated Settlement Conference.
228. This is not a new idea. Dwight Golann has devised a set of prescriptions to help
evaluative mediators maintain neutrality. Foremost in his suggestions is to allow partici-
pants to enter into a contract before beginning the mediation whereby they authorize the
mediator to employ a certain style. See GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, supra note 8,
§ 10.1.
229. John Bickerman, an attorney-mediator, advocates for this position. John Bick-
erman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH CosT LITIG. 70 (1996). He
contends that parties should have the independence to select the type of mediator who
they think will provide the best mediation service for their kind of dispute, or at least allow
the mediator to use a variety of styles as dictated by market forces. Id. at 70. Mr. Bickerman
also points out that a mediator does not exceed her role of neutrality when she provides
[Vol. 42
Rather than allow the mediator to educate the parties, as is most
often done at the beginning of a mediation, someone who is not part
of the specific mediation session could perform the task; possible peo-
ple include court personnel in court-connected mediation programs,
an administrator in a private or neighborhood mediation, or a written
pamphlet prepared by any of these people or by a professional media-
tion organization. The mediation education would create party aware-
ness of appropriate mediator behavior under either process.
1. The Role of a Facilitative Mediator in Mediation
A facilitative mediator may continue to serve under the tradi-
tional notions of mediation; she should be able to maintain neutrality
and impartiality since her main responsibility is to enhance partici-
pant communication by emphasizing their interests. Through efforts
to foster participant creativity, problem-solving, and personal evalua-
tion, a facilitative mediator should be able to maintain the objectivity
necessary to remain impartial. The mediator cannot, however, seek to
ensure a fair result, attempt to balance the participant's power, or pro-
mote informed decision-making. Consequently, Standards would
need to be modified to fit within the new description of "mediation."
2. The Role of an Evaluative Mediator in a Mediated Settlement
Conference
If participants want a more directive mediator, they may choose
the Mediated Settlement Conference rather than a traditional media-
tion. In a Mediated Settlement Conference, the participants could
agree at the outset of the mediation to allow certain mediator
behavior.
The participants could authorize the mediator to offer evaluation
and even go so far as to encourage the parties in one direction. Under
this process, the mediator could be authorized to ensure a just and
fair result, a balanced process, and advocacy on behalf of a weak party
if performed in a non-intimidating manner. Such authorizations
mean that the evaluative mediator in this setting need not necessarily
maintain impartiality. Standards would need to be modified
accordingly.
In a Mediated Settlement Conference, the mediator would be ex-
pected to express some sort of evaluation. If the definition does not
"frank assessments" regarding a case. Id. The parties can make intelligent decisions based
on their positions of being fully informed. Id.
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require the mediator to be impartial, the mediator could approach
the process as though she was facilitating and enhancing party com-
munication as well as encouraging parties to resolve a dispute.
D. Alternative 4: Create a Hierarchy of Values Within Mediation
Standards
The fourth and final alternative posits an organizational hierar-
chy, or prioritization of mediation values, within a single set of Stan-
dards. Standards would retain the typical values such as party self-
determination, neutral process, impartial third-party mediator, and
prohibition of conflicts of interest. The only difference would be to
prioritize the values. The single, most important value would essen-
tially trump other values. Some lesser values could trump the least
important values. Such an approach is analogous to the posture in the
current ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct wherein Rule 1.6,
Confidentiality of Information, specifically trumps all but one desig-
nated rule. 230
The complexity of Alternative 4 lies in the process of determining
the most important value. Party self-determination is touted as the
fundamental principle of mediation and therefore may be considered
the most important value. The notion of informed decision-making,
balance of power, and balanced process are inherent parts of party
autonomy because arguably a party cannot decide on a final resolu-
tion for a mediated dispute unless the party fully comprehends the
consequences of that decision. In such a scenario, a mediator could
sacrifice her impartiality to ensure that the parties are fully informed
of the consequences of their decision so that no party takes advantage
of any other party. This is just one example of how an evaluative medi-
ator could direct and guide the parties without the fear of violating
the ethical requirements of impartiality.
Alternative 4 would continue to promote the flexibility of various
mediator styles and mediation models while concurrently requiring
mediators to conform to all Standards. Mediation would continue as a
flexible, fluid process during the evolution of ethical Standards and
other guidelines necessary to regulate an industry.
230. Language in the following ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT illustrates that
each of the rules is limited by Rule 1.6: Rules 1.8(f), 1.9(b), 1.10(b), 1.14(c), 2.3(c), 4.1 (b),
8.1(b), and 8.3(c). ABA Model Rule 3.3, Candor to the Tribunal, is the only rule that
requires disclosure of information otherwise deemed confidential pursuant to Rule 1.6. Id.
at 3.3(c).
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Several scholars already have weighed in on this type of alterna-
tive. Professor Michael Moffitt proffers the same basic approach with
respect to the revised Model Standards, noting that the revised Model
Standards fail to create any "hierarchy of ethical concerns" by disre-
garding ethical tensions such as those posed in this Article. 23 1 Profes-
sor Moffitt advocates for specific guidance by designating one
standard that trumps the others.232
Professor Ellen Waldman acknowledges the internal inconsisten-
cies of Standards, especially since they apply to such a far-reaching
field in terms of subject matter application and mediator style. 233 Be-
cause it is difficult to create an all-encompassing set of Standards to
apply to all types of disputes and scenarios, Professor Waldman pro-
poses a "fact-specific, context-specific balancing approach.."234 She ex-
plains that mediators should consciously acknowledge mediation
values yet determine which values are dominant and which are
subordinate. 235 Mediators can engage in this weighing and balancing
process by assessing the type of dispute and relational needs of the
individuals, including the balance of power and resources. 236 The
presence of representatives, such as attorneys, also affects the media-
tion dimension, especially when the representatives do not appear to
be equally competent. Thus, "mediators should strive for . . . con-
scious, mindful consideration of the values at stake and the construc-
tion of a deliberate set of priorities that takes into account the
particular circumstances of the case. 237
Professor Waldman makes a passionate argument in favor of a
balancing process by individual mediators based on subject matter
and relational factors. While seemingly well-reasoned, it allows for the
unfettered discretion of individual mediators. A better approach
would be for the Standards to highlight the most important mediation
value and then allow mediator freedom to decide how to balance
other subordinate values. In this manner, the Standards would pro-
vide at least some guidance, yet maintain the flexibility and fluidity
inherent in mediations.
231. Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again: Why the Devil Is Not in the Details of the
New Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2006, at 31-32.
232. Id.
233. Telephone Interview with Ellen Waldman, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson
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VI. Conclusion
For years a dialogue has taken place regarding mediator styles
and whether evaluative techniques are appropriate. Although some
people may want to continue the dialogue, the simple fact is that
mediators assert a variety of styles such as facilitative, evaluative, trans-
formative, or some derivative classification. Mediators have the flexi-
bility to use a variety of styles for a number of reasons-most notably
due to the participants' unique needs. Despite choices regarding style,
mediators are mandated to serve with impartiality. This Article dem-
onstrates the tension between impartiality requirements and mediator
styles most commonly associated with evaluative mediators.
The tension has resulted in the mediator's dilemma. How can a
mediator be neutral and impartial when engaged in any and all medi-
ator styles? It is time to address the mediator's dilemma so that we may
act progressively as the mediation field matures.
This Article proposes several alternatives to ensure the integrity
and credibility of the mediation field. First, for states that do not have
Standards, wait and study the mediator's dilemma before adopting im-
partiality requirements that conflict with mediator styles. Second,
broaden the definition of mediation by removing mediator impartial-
ity requirements. Such an approach would permit mediators to be
flexible enough to conform to any and all mediator styles. Third, nar-
row the definition of mediation so that different definitions with cor-
respondingly different mediator duties apply to facilitative and
evaluative mediators, the two most common mediator styles. Fourth,
create a hierarchy of values within Standards that would allow flexibil-
ity while maintaining the rigors of the most important ethical values.
Now it is up to the scholars, practicing mediators, regulators, and leg-
islators to begin the dialogue for change and choose the most benefi-
cial alternative.
[Vol. 42
